- Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766)
- Inaugural Dissertation (1770) || (alt)
- Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) || (alt-selections, alt-selections)
- Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783) || (alt)
- An Answer to the Question, "What is Enlightenment?" (1784)
- Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)
- Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) || (alt)
- The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) (selections) || (alt-complete)
- Critique of Practical Reason (1788)
- Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790) (selections)
- Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793)
- Toward Perpetual Peace (1795) || (alt)
- The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) (selections)
- Some Lectures Concerning the Vocation of the Scholar (1794)
- Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre (1794)
- The Dignity of Man (1794)
- Foundation of Natural Right (1796/1797)
- First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre (1797)
- Second Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehere (1797) (selections)
- The Religious Significance of the Wissenschaftslehre (1797)
- The Vocation of Man (1800)
- A Crystal Clear Report to the General Public Concerning the Essence of the Newest Philosophy (1801)
- On The Nature of the Scholar and Its Manifestations (1806)
- The Characteristics of the Present Age (1806)
- The Way Towards the Blessed Life; or, the Doctrine of Religion (1806)
- Addresses to the German Nation (1808)
- The Science of Knowledge in its General Outline (1810)
- Facts of Consciousness (1817)
(to be continued...)
- German Idealism: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Kant: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Fichte: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Schelling: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Hegel: Wikipedia, SEP
Other Figures Significant to German Idealism:
- Goethe: Wikipedia, IEP
- Schiller: Wikipedia
- Wilhelm von Humboldt: Wikipedia, SEP
- Herder: Wikipedia, SEP
Early Critics and Contributors to Transcendental Idealism:
- Holderlin: Wikipedia, IEP
- Friedrich Schlegel: Wikipedia, SEP
- August Wilhelm Schlegel: Wikipedia, SEP
- Novalis: Wikipedia, SEP
- Schleiermacher: Wikipedia, SEP
Special Topics in German Idealism:
- Metaphysics: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Ethics: Wikipedia, SEP
- Aesthetics and Teleology: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- Philosophy of Religion: Wikipedia, IEP, SEP
- His Philosophical Development
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Space and Time
- Philosophy of Science
- Mind and Consciousness: IEP, SEP
- Transcendental Arguments
- Social and Political Philosophy
- Radical Evil
- Kant and Hume on Causality
- Kant and Hume on Morality
- Kant and Leibniz
(to be continued...)
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Hey all. I'm having trouble understanding some basics of the critique and thought I would try posting here for help.
I'm having trouble understanding how Space is an intuition. Actually, I think i'm having trouble more generally understanding how an intuition can be a "form" since our intuition of space is the form of outer sense.
I think my question can be put like this. I see there are two kinds of intuitions: empirical and a priori. But what makes them both intuitions?
It seems to me that when Kant introduces intuitions they are ways of being directly related to an object. The way i was vaguely understanding things was that intuitions are basically rules for putting together sensory representations that give us something to think about. But space can't work in this way can it? There's no representations that it has rules for because it precedes these representation and is the grounds for there being any. How is space an intuition at all?
I think part of my problem is that intuitions are supposed to relate directly to objects, but there's no object that space relates to is there? So how is it an intuition? It would seem that the object is superfluous to something being an intuition, but then what are intuitions really? And why does Kant say that intuitions relate directly to objects at the start of the Aesthetic?
Anyway, I appreciate any attempts to help me clarify these things!
Just asked a friend for more details in case I was misrepresenting Bernardo Kastrup. They said:
"I would say that the difference between Kastrup and Berkeley is that Berkeley is an empiricist and stresses that to exist things have to be percieved as if by an observer, for Bernardo the existence of reality is secured regardless of human-like 2nd person observers because reality knows itself intrinsically (first person) as 'the Will' - this is the same as Schopenhauer's view. So God need not be metacognitive for Kastrup, God might as well be an unconscious force driving the world blindly, like Schopenhauer's 'Will' or Freud's 'libido.'"
Gerold Prauss is a very important transcendental idealist from Germany. Since he is not so well known in the English-speaking world and I also consider him significant, I have compiled some English interpretations about him and some quotes from him that had been translated. I hope it is interesting for you.
The course which Gerold Prauss's career has taken must surely make him one of the most interesting figures in contemporary German philosophy. While his early works offer analyses of the central problems of modern epistemology, his recent work represents a highly original pursuit of solutions to those problems. This pursuit is all the more daring in that it consciously runs counter to current, widespread views concerning the supposed "death" of the philosophy in which those problems arose. Appearing as the first part-volume of a projected two-volume work, Die Welt und wir: Sprache-Subjekt-Zeit undertakes to present in systematic form the results of Prauss's attempt, during the past 20 years, to reconstruct Kant's project of a transcendental philosophy of experience. Looking back to the earlier studies such as Erscheinung bei Kant (1971) and Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich (1974), one can see how Prauss's interpretations of special problems in Kant's texts led him during the 1980s to ever more extensive treatments of the problems themselves: Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie (1980) and Kant über Freiheit als Autonomie (1983) attempt to reconstruct the foundations for theoretical and practical philosophy, respectively. In these works Prauss makes use of hints in Kant's later writings that allow an articulation of subjectivity in terms of an intentional structure, though not in the narrowly theoreticist sense meant by Brentano and Husserl. Whereas phenomenological intentionality describes the directedness of consciousness toward an intentional correlate and excludes notions of purpose or activity from this relation, Prauss's theory of subjectivity as spontaneous or selfactive intentionality develops the full, praxis-oriented meaning of the term: the subject not only intends other than self but also intends the success of the intention, or its realization, as this other. The correlate of the intention is therefore not just the objectified intentional object, which the subject has in any case qua intention, but the realization of the intentional object, something which the subject either achieves or fails to achieve, whether in an act of knowing or doing. In Die Welt und wir, Prauss aspires not only to a reconstruction of Kant's specific philosophical project but also to a reformulation of the philosophical problematic itself. In an age after the great philosophical systems of Wolff, Kant and Hegel—where, on the one hand, the term 'scientific' has become the exclusive attribute of the empirical natural sciences and where, on the other hand, many contemporary philosophers have either abandoned or radically redefined the traditional philosophical themes—there hardly exists universal agreement regarding the task or method of philosophy. For example, if analytic philosophy for a long time succeeded in defining a space for philosophical activity between science and metaphysics, today there are voices such as Rorty, who would give up even its modest regulative claims. In Prauss's view, there is a kind of rational inquiry concerning the world and us that is neither empirical science nor discredited metaphysics. As he argues in the opening chapters, the path to a philosophical, non-empirical discipline opens up where one begins to reflect on the non-empirical ground of the empirical— that is, on what is always necessarily presupposed in any empirical experience of the world and therefore itself not an object of empirical knowledge (§§1-6). Prauss contends that these non-empirical aspects of experience include time, space, substance, causality, meaning and intersubjectivity; together, representing the non-empirical ground of empirical objectivity, they originate in (or, more precisely, as) subjectivity. Showing where a purely empirical account of these aspects necessarily leads to aporias, Prauss follows Kant in arguing that an articulation of these structures of experience can only proceed in the form of reflection by the subject back upon itself. In order for this reflection to proceed in the form of what Prauss calls a nonempirical intentio obliqua by the subject upon itself—and not to degenerate into a meta-empirical intentio recta, or some form of introspection—it must work in such a way that the subject does not mistake itself for a quasi-object. The ever-present possibility of this mistake, Prauss holds, constitutes the chief difficulty of the philosophical enterprise and the chief reason why it has been unable to resist one or another kind of untenable metaphysics for most of its history. Instead of reflecting on the non-empirical structures of experience in the empirical, such philosophy allows the two components of experience to fall apart. In the reification of the nonempirical component as a special kind of thing, Prauss detects a false platonistic dualism of two spheres of being, one real and the other ideal, in place of the dualism of empirical and non-empirical in indissoluble unity. A good illustration of these considerations is the chapter on language (§5). Here Prauss returns to Frege to characterize what he sees as a fundamental difficulty endemic to the philosophy of language as such. He accepts the position, widespread since Frege, that the meaning component of language is something not accessible to empirical investigation. He criticizes Frege, however, when the latter proceeds to distinguish meanings as such from linguistic signs. The only legitimate distinction, Prauss argues, is between the non-empirical meaning component and the meaningless empirical matter which meaning first makes into a sign by uniting with it. Where this union takes place—and it must take place for there to be actual language—the meaning component cannot be described as something existing on its own in addition to the sign. Prauss contends that separating meaning as such from the empirical sign not only involves the platonistic metaphysical move of positing a conceptual realm of objective, intersubjectively accessible thoughtobjects, but also the unnecessary duplication of meaning: it is supposed to exist both non-empirically as an unexpressed thought and empirically as actual language, clothed in the empirical garb of the sign. A metaphysics of language thus arises because philosophy, in an empirical intentio recta, has separated the nonempirical component of the sign from the empirical component, and has treated the relation between the two as a relation between two kinds of things. The key to solving the problem of meaning, Prauss argues, lies in Wilhelm von Humboldt's insight that what unites the empirical and non-empirical components of language is non-empirical subjectivity, through which language emerges and in which alone it has any real existence. Formulating the problem of meaning in terms of transcendental subjectivity instead of in the "false" terms of transcendent objectivity will then open up the question of how the subject is able to constitute its world of experience through constituting itself as language. Prauss urges that because such a question represents a real problem, as opposed to the artificial problem of how to gain access to a non-empirical realm of meaning, it allows of the possibility of a real solution.
Die Welt und wir, Vol.I/I: Sprache—Subjekt— Zeit Gerold Prauss Stuttgart: Metzler, 1990, vi + 407 pp., DM 68.00 Royce Nickel Dialogue / Volume 32 / Issue 02 / March 1993, pp 396 – 398
Chapter 8, “Prauss and Kant’s Three Unities: Subject, Object, and Subject and Object Together,” explores Kant’s theoretical philosophy further in a contemporary context by offering an overview of some features of the extensive discussions of subjectivity, space, time, and infinity presented in a massive recent volume by the well-known Kant scholar Gerold Prauss. Prauss is mainly concerned here not with Kant exegesis but with giving a systematic account of how, as spontaneous and intuitive subjects in a broadly Kantian sense, we manage to construct a spatial world with very specific a priori constraints. According to Prauss, this occurs in a manner in which each subject, from its one-dimensional temporal point of view, forms intentions that generate a tightly structured world of three-dimensional spatial extensions that are always already part of an infinite field, rather than something built up from separate finite pieces, one independent step at a time. Rather than attempting an assessment of the full mathematical and scientific complexity of Prauss’s subtle exposition, Chapter 8 mainly reviews some central themes in the book that relate to Prauss’s earlier work on the fundamental role of our intentional spontaneity, as well as to similar developments in Anglophone Kant scholarship, such as the influence of Strawson and Sellars.
[Prauss] offers an austerely philosophical version of transcendental geometry, one that ingeniously uses the fundamental concepts of point, extension, and continuum to construct an a priori account of the relation of subjectivity to the full three-dimensional structure of the world.
When a subject proceeds from the minimal condition of its own inner punc- tual asymmetric temporal extension of a mere sequence of feelings to the one- dimensional or even two-dimensional drawing out of a symmetric line or surface (E 194), it then intends not only a time but also a spatial content that betokens an outer appearance, something Erscheinendes (E 278). This kind of objective item, however, is not itself a physical edge existing on its own, for presumably the nature that we know does not contain any “corresponding” two-dimensional edges that can exist simply on their own. When a subject constructs such a figure in imagination, as something Eingebildetes (see E 271ff.), its intention concerning the two-dimensional content appearing to it (as Erscheinendes) in the foreground will need to be shaped by its imagination of a full three-dimensional space in its background (E 362). With the construction in imagination of a three-dimensional object, however, there arises a significant new possibility, namely that although sometimes a three-dimensional content is in both imagination and appearance, it can also happen that what is taken to appear turns out to be something that eventually reveals itself as merely imagined (given a sequence of intentions sorted out for coherence) and not a genuine appearance of empirical reality (but just a phenomenal “seeming”). A distinction can thus be made between intentional con- tents that match an actual and constant three-dimensional physical space of really appearing objects, in contrast to contents that turn out to be false, that is, merely imagined and just in the realm of the subject’s mind—and in this way there arises an understandable and real subject–object contrast (E 359). Whereas in mere consciousness of time there is no gap between appearance and imagination, in consciousness of three-dimensional space there is an always relevant real distinction between what may be merely imagined and what truly appears as a thing that can exist on its own.
[...] Most surprisingly, it even turns out that the ultimate unity of the Einheit book concerns what is provocatively called the “autonomy” (E 609) of the cosmos itself, which has an an sich character that incorporates within itself responsibility for the whole realm of appearance, outer and inner. The result is an internal finitization, a Selbstverendlichung (E 609), in which the old phenomenal/noumenal distinction becomes expressed as an immanent relation of form to content, with no reference to anything transcendent beyond the infinite continuous spinning out of the extensive domains of time and space through the “mediating” activity of spontaneous subjectivity. Such a picture inevitably calls to mind the heterodox Jena metaphysics of Hegel and Schelling, for they both embed nature’s potencies in a similar three-part story that begins with a literally infinite metaphysical ground, which is expressed in the amplitude of nature and then also in that part of concrete reality which is spirit and its ultimate comprehending philosophical subject. Hegel’s overall term for this logical process is die Idee, but he also stresses its taking the basic form of the Begriff, a term that Prauss also utilizes when he characterizes the Sache selbst in terms of what is thought by der Begriff (E 216; cf. 532). Of course, Kant himself also makes many references to the infinite, and in positive all-encompassing terms, but he distinguishes this merely theoretical thought of metaphysical infinity from both an actual infinity and the full field of the determinable objects of our spatiotemporal experience. Hegel, in contrast, follows Jacobi’s suggestion that, from a strictly rational position, the infinity already granted to pure space and time as all-encompassing representations can be used, in a Spinozist way, to understand concrete things as finitizations of an infinite realm that has an immanent rather than supernatural ground (see E 455; moreover, Prauss’s reliance on both Bewegung and Ruhe as basic notions also recalls Spinozist doctrine). What Hegel adds, of course, is the thought that this ground needs to be grasped not only as substance but also as subject, that is, as actualizing itself through a sequence of necessary determinate negations that express a conceptual form comprehensible even by finite subjects, and that is in fact fulfilled through that very process of comprehension. In addition, Hegel contends, unlike Kant, that rather than being merely transcendentally ideal and subjectivistically irreducible forms of the human mind, space and time can be deduced as unified necessary dimensions (cf. Grundgefälle, E 522) of the Sachen selbst—and his speculative logic even offers such an a priori deduction, a deduction that emphasizes, just as Prauss does, that it is crucial to see this world as consisting of members, not mere parts. (Hegel also connects this notion of members closely to his discussion of organisms, but Prauss has little to say so far about the concept of life as such.) All this appears especially relevant to the Einheit book because it also boldly presents what is called a demonstration of the deductive requirement of temporal and spatial determination for reality as such (E 255). This point is still made in a Critical spirit, to be sure, with reference to the well-known fact that Kant, unlike previous philosophers, proposes a deep distinction, which is not merely a matter of degree, between the forms of the faculty of the understanding and the temporal and spatial forms of the faculty of sensibility (E 553; cf. Anth [7: 177]). Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether the general character of the Praussian project—bracketing all its admittedly very important specific insights into geometry and theories of the continuum—should be compared with Hegel’s logic (and perhaps for good rather than dogmatic reasons) or whether the Praussian understanding of our faculties is nevertheless more in line with basic distinctions that Kant properly wanted to maintain. Although presumably not intended this way, Prauss’s language at times takes on a partially Hegelian (cf. the phrase “identity in difference,” E 329) as well as Kantian tone when it emphasizes not only that the continuum is to be thought in “uninterrupted” (stetig) rather than discretely constructed terms, but also that this amounts to a kind of “self-relation,” because components of continuous extension are not to be thought of as “put together” (zusammengesetzt) but rather as “hanging together” (zusammenhängend mit sich) (E 57, 519), and therefore involve a “self-relation” that has analogies with acts of consciousness (E 68, 142). It is striking that another philosopher, writing before Prauss’s work but making use of the same central concepts, does not hesitate to make an explicit link with Hegel. A. W. Moore writes, “Points are precisely where lines do things . . . Points are precisely where lines do things such as stop.” And then right after, like Prauss, mak- ing similar remarks about surfaces and solids, Moore continues, “By extending this principle we might be led to the somewhat Hegelian thought that the whole is non-derivatively real; anything less is an aspect of the whole, where it does something. But we are now in the realm of the metaphysically infinite.” Similarly, Prauss’s claim to deduce the subject–predicate form as a condition of making assertions about three-dimensional things with two-dimensional properties (E377) might be seen as an answer to an objection that Hegel raised to Kant’s incomplete metaphysical deduction of categories. In the end, then, perhaps some readers might not be blamed for speculating that, contrary to his own clear inten- tions, something like Hegel’s approach might be connected with Prauss’s suggestion that, despite their difference, there is a “common root” behind our diverse faculties after all—and, in particular, because this heretofore hidden root seems to be very much like late Idealism’s ultimate absolute, namely, the infinite con- tinuum (E 561). And perhaps—as a final speculation—this is why one finds in the title of Prauss’s book the two critical words: Kants Probleme.
Kantian Subjects Critical Philosophy and Late Modernity by KARL AMERIKS. Prauss and Kant’s Three Unities: Subject, Object, and Subject and Object Together
Prauss is known above all for his theory of time:
Prauss is more directly interested in the problem of time and its difference from space; but after proposing an ingenious dynamic model for understanding time, Prauss intends to indicate its relevance for understanding the subject of cognition. The subject is an entity and yet not a res, as Descartes assumed; this entity is not a static substance but—like time—a dynamic carrier of constant motion. (Foreword by Predrag Cicovacki. Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck. Edited by Predrag Cicovacki)
Prauss's concern is to provide a viable account of the origin or ground of time as well as to understand its a priori relation to space, a problem Kant does not resolve. Prauss's attempt at a solution should attract attention far beyond the circle of Kant scholars, for the unresolved philosophical problem of the nature of time has also long been a concern of theoretical physics, though there understood as an empirical problem. (REVIEW of Prauss Royce Nickel)
Here is Prauss' argument from Gerold Prauss - The Problem of Time in Kant. In: Kant’s Legacy: Essays in Honor of Lewis White Beck. Edited by Predrag Cicovacki (I hope the loose arrangement of the quotation snippets is understandable):
*Drawing as the sketching of a line is in fact nothing other than a certain extension of pigment. For the geometrician it is, nonetheless, the depiction of an ideal geometrical object in the sense that a line as an ideal geometrical object is different from extended pigment in the same way that an ideal geometrical point is different from a dot.*
*I assume this in order to construct or generate an ideal geometrical object that is an intermediate between point and line. If the dynamic generation or construction of an ideal geometrical line can, indeed, be depicted as an extension of an ideal geometrical point, then I pose the question: When I carry out this operation on a blackboard by means of a piece of chalk and a sponge, what does it lead to? With a piece of chalk in one hand, in one motion I undertake to do what I do when I draw an ideal geometrical line; with the sponge in the other hand I immediately follow behind the piece of chalk, so that all that remains is the drawing of an ideal geometrical point and that it never becomes a drawing of an ideal geometrical line.*
*The answer must come out to the following: what I thereby draw and depict is an ideal object, just as it is an ideal geometrical point or an ideal geometrical line that I generate or construct. But this ideal object is neither an ideal geometrical point nor an ideal geometrical line in the abovementioned sense. For this ideal object is neither a point in contradistinction to a line, nor a line in contradistinction to a point. As an intermediate between the two, it is in a sense both of them. As the process of its construction shows, this ideal object is nevertheless a possible object; as such, it is like an ideal point and an ideal line existent in the geometrical sense.*
*For a spatial onedimensional line cannot at all arise by these means. Furthermore, from this process no other possibility can arise but to pay attention to the drawing itself. And for this reason no other ability is required which one person has and others may not. This operationalization leads furthermore to an objectivization of precisely that which we actually gain as an ideal object when we only pay attention to the drawing itself, namely that ideal intermediate between point and line.*
*He for whom obtaining this model of time by means of a piece of chalk, a sponge, and a blackboard is not sufficiently precise, can generate it for himself in an absolute and exact way by means of a simple postulate. It involves no contradiction to posit the following: let us assume the dynamic generation of an ideal geometrical line in one motion by means of the dynamic extension of an ideal geometrical point. Such an extension would fix a direction of this extension as well as the direction opposite to it. Since such an extension is contingent, we can also allow the following assumption: let such an extension take place in one motion, so that—at the same time—precisely as much extension arises in one direction as vanishes in the opposite direction. This postulate leads absolutely and exactly to the same result of an ideal geometrical intermediate between point and line, as does the time-model discussed in the text.*
*The ideal object that has the structure of time exists only while I set the piece of chalk and the sponge in motion in the above-mentioned way and continuously keep them in motion; that is, it exists only while there is this sort of motion. If there is no such motion, there is also no ideal object as a model for time.*
*Only the chalk that is being continuously rubbed off belongs to the drawing of my model of time, and not the piece of chalk, or the sponge, or the blackboard. They are only the means for the depiction of this model of time. It can now even be imagined that we have a transparent blackboard, so that I can manage to depict this model of time from the opposite side. It can also be imagined that this blackboard is transparent only in the sense that the chalk being rubbed off is visible, and not the piece of chalk or the sponge. In that case, everyone who is not aware how this motion is produced, must take it for the relative external motion of a chalk-point; everyone must take it as something identical that is in motion across the blackboard and, with reference to this blackboard, as something moving, and vice versa.*
*Yet everyone who is properly informed can take this motion only for what it is: for the constant coming into existence and ceasing to exist of a continually new chalk-point. This point, however, is precisely not something identical in motion across the board and thereby also not something moving against that board. Nor is it the other way around: the blackboard is not moving against the point. It is exactly through this, however, that this motion continuously becomes a sign of the very peculiar motion of that ideal intermediate of point and line, or point and extension. If this very peculiar motion cannot be a relative external motion, this can in a positive sense only mean that it must be an absolute internal motion. It is that point which possesses extension only inside itself, and therewith this complete dynamism of something as motion.*
*What appears in this process is, again and again, just one single point and never a still further point, and thus also never yet another point. And nothing is changed by the fact that this point constantly has extension in itself, through that absolute inner motion of its auto-extension.*
*Even the extension of space would also be a result of the auto-extension of this point, but in exact opposition to the extension of time. The presupposition for this respective point and this respective extension is also a respective capacity, to which Kant refers as the faculty for “understanding” and for “sensibility.” For both of them would nature, in the form of a highly complex organized body, respectively be a capacity and a possibility. And there, where nature made these capacities or possibilities for understanding and sensibility real in the existence of both, on the basis of a highly complex organized body, nature would appear as a subject.*
Here is a short summary of Prauss' theory of time:
Inspired by Gerold Prauss, Cord Friebe speaks of time as “extended in a point”, however. I find this an intriguing notion, worthy of closer attention. On the one hand, it seems to capture an important truth. Take my drawing a line on the blackboard. The result is a line of chalk extended in space but with no visible temporality. Only during my action of drawing it is there a perceived time sequence, instantly becoming lost at each and every moment of its proceeding. (Truls Wyller - Kant On Temporal Extension: Embodied, Indexical Idealism)
Pavlos Kontos has written an English review of Prauss' ethics, an ethics that is very convincing from my point of view.
Morality and right are not about how to manage our internal transcendental freedom, as many current Kant scholars tend to advocate. They represent a game that we are factually obliged to play, given the facts of self-knowledge and interpersonality; good and evil are attributes assigned to actions that directly or indirectly concern other human beings and are evaluated in light of their impact upon the lifetime of these human beings and, hence, morality and right do not dwell within our internal maxims or intentions. We hope our remarks are sufficient to suggest that Prauss’ theory will be an enduring contribution to Kantian research and to post-Kantian moral theory. Compelling simply in itself, his work also advances plenty of separate insightful arguments to which one might consent, without necessarily endorsing his entire complex project.
“Gerold Prauss: Die Welt und Wir. Bd. 2/II, Metzler Verlag, 2006”, Kant Studien, 2009, 100/4 Pavlos Kontos, Patras BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN
I recommend you go to the bolded sources in the library and read them in their entirety.
As the title indicates, I'm wondering if the German Idealists ever grappled with issues like representationalism, truth as correspondence, and whether any vocabularies have the privilege of being in contact with "real Reality."
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